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FERGUSON V. CITY OF CHARLESTON:' GATEKEEPER OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT'S "SPECIAL NEEDS" EXCEPTION
I. FACTS
A. Motivations for Policy M-7
Remember the war on drugs? Numerous policies ("Just Say No"
and Drug Free School Zones) were designed to protect the nation's
children from the dangers of addiction. D.A.R.E. officers debuted in
schools and peeing in a cup for drug screening became a normal part
of going out for the team. Policy M-7 was a urine-screening rubric
adopted by the Medical University of South Carolina for identifying
and assisting cocaine users among their prenatal patients.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, discussions within the medical
community began to reflect a greater societal concern over increased
drug use and its effect on children specifically. Medical journals pub-
lished telling research studies documenting a national epidemic.2 In
South Carolina a number of these studies focused on prenatal drug
use. Results indicated that approximately 15,000 babies suffering
from in-utero exposure to illegal drugs were born in that state every
year.3
In particular, South Carolina became most concerned with the
social, physical, and economic costs of maternal cocaine use on the
mother, child, and the state as a whole, including serious health
impacts, increased need for neonatal intensive care, social services,
foster care, and special education services, increased family stress, and
reduced maternal bonding.4 Additionally, the cost of caring for one
crack-addicted infant until the age of one year commonly exceeded
$50,000.' Severely exposed infants (especially those sustaining brain
damage) required permanent lifetime care costing in excess of one mil-
lion dollars per infant.6
In 1998 employees of the Medical University of South Carolina
(MUSC) noted increased use of cocaine among mothers receiving pre-
natal care at their facility.7 Concerned about cocaine-related health
1. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1284 (2001).
2. Respondents' Brief at 6, Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936).
3. Id. at 5.
4. Id. at 4.
5. Id. at 5.
6. Id.
7. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1284 (2001).
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risks to the fetus and mother, MUSC began routinely screening urine
samples from patients meeting one of six indicators of maternal
cocaine use.8 Mothers testing positive were referred to drug treatment
programs. 9 However, very few referred patients followed through with
the program, and after just four months the policy was generally
deemed ineffective.' 0
B. Designing of Policy M-7
MUSC began to consider ways to increase the effectiveness of its
policy. Nurse Shirley Brown, MUSC's obstetrics case manager, heard a
news broadcast explaining that police in Greenville were arresting
pregnant cocaine users on child abuse charges and believed the possi-
bility of such prosecution could be used to make the counseling
offered by MUSC more attractive to addicts." Nurse Brown discussed
her idea with MUSC general counsel, Mr. Good, who contacted
Charleston's Solicitor, Mr. Condon.' 2 An inter-agency task force was
organized by Solicitor Condon, including representatives from MUSC,
local law enforcement, the County Substance Abuse Commission, and
the Department of Social Services.' 3 "POLICY M-7," a set of guide-
lines for "[m]anagement of [d]rug [a]buse [d]uring [p]regnancy," was
the result of task force discussions.' 4 Policy M-7 was adopted sepa-
rately by MUSC. 15 It provided the hospital with a procedure for identi-
fying and assisting pregnant drug users, beginning with urine
screening of patients meeting at least one of nine medical criteria,
maintaining a chain of custody for samples, educating mothers testing
positive about the dangers of prenatal drug abuse to themselves and
their fetus, and referral to substance abuse clinics. 16 "Most important,
it added the threat of law enforcement intervention that 'provided the
necessary leverage to make the policy effective."" 7 If a patient failed to
follow-up with substance abuse treatment or tested positive a second
8. Respondents' Brief at 6, Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936).
9. Id.
10. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1284; Respondents' Brief at 6, Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. 1281
(2001) (No. 99-936).
11. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1284; Oral Argument at 18, Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. 1281
(2001) (No. 99-936).
.12. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1284, Petitioners' Brief at 3, Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. 1281
(2001) (No. 99-936).
13. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1285.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1285 (quoting Respondents' Brief at 8).
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time, Mr. Condon's office was notified and the mother was arrested.' 8
Initially, if a patient tested positive during or after labor, police were
notified immediately as well (regardless of whether she had received
prenatal treatment at MUSC).' 9 This aspect of the policy was modified
in 1990 to allow a patient testing positive during labor to avoid arrest
by consenting to substance abuse treatment.2" MUSC considered M-7
to be very effective. During M-7's implementation, 223 of 253 women
initially testing positive completed substance abuse programs and did
not test positive a second time.2'
C. M-7 Conflicts with Civil Rights
Ten women who sought obstetrical care at MUSC and were
searched under Policy M-7 filed suit against the City of Charleston, law
enforcement officials, and MUSC trustees and personnel.22 Two of
these women, Lori Griffin and Sandra Powell, were screened in 1989
before the M-7 modifications and were not presented with drug treat-
ment as an option to avoid arrest.23 Ms. Griffin, 8 months pregnant,
was arrested when she came to MUSC for prenatal care. She spent the
final three weeks of her pregnancy in a jail cell from which she was
transported back and forth to the hospital for further care. 24 Ms. Pow-
ell was searched upon her arrival to MUSC in labor. She was hand-
cuffed in her hospital gown after giving birth and transported to jail.25
The remaining eight plaintiffs received a "Solicitor's Letter" at the time
of testing positive, explaining the urinalysis results and stating: "If you
fail to attend Substance Abuse and Pre-Natal Care you will be arrested
by Charleston City Police and Prosecuted by the Office of the Solici-
tor."26 Seven were later arrested.27
Plaintiffs challenged M-7's validity on a number of grounds
including equal protection, invasion of privacy, and state tort law
prohibiting the abuse of process in administering administrative poli-
18. Respondents' Brief at 9, Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936). "Even
after arrest, the patient could avoid prosecution by completing a drug treatment
program." Respondents' Brief at 9 n.5, Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936).
19. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1285.
20. Id.
21. Respondents' Brief at 29-30, Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936).
22. Petitioners' Brief at 1, Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936).
23. Petitioners' Brief at 7-8, Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936).
24. Id. at 7
25. Id. at 8.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 10.
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cies.28 However, the matter on appeal was limited to plaintiffs' claim
that M-7 advanced "wArrantless and nonconsensual drug tests con-
ducted for criminal investigatory purposes."29 Defendants countered
that petitioners had consented to urine screening and that even absent
consent, such searches were justified by non-law enforcement pur-
poses under the "special needs doctrine."30
D. Procedural History
The district court submitted plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim
to the jury on the question of whether the 10 women had consented to
urinalysis. The jury found that plaintiffs had consented to the
searches.31 The district court rejected defendants' special needs
defense, determining as a matter of law that the searches were not car-
ried out by medical personnel for independent medical purposes. 32
"Instead, the police came in and there was an agreement reached that
the positive screens would be shared by police."3 3 Plaintiffs appealed,
arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's find-
ing of consent.34
Conversely, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit did not
address the issue of consent.3 5 Instead, the circuit court determined
that M-7 furthered "special government needs beyond the normal need
for law enforcement. '36 The court based its holding on the district
court's finding that "MUSC personnel conducted the urine drug
screens for medical purposes wholly independent of an intent to aid
law enforcement efforts. ' 37 Applying the balancing test enumerated in
special needs precedent,38 the majority explained the rising use of
28. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 121 S. Ct.
1281 (2001).
29. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1286.
30. Id.
31. Respondents' Brief at 10-11, Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936).
32. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1286.
33. Id.
34. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 476.
35. During oral argumentJustice O'Connor suggested to Respondents' counsel that
perhaps there was a question as to the sufficiency of evidence with regard to women
who came to the hospital only for labor. She questioned the legitimacy and informed
and voluntary nature of signing "consent" forms under such circumstances. Oral
Argument at 42, Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936).
36. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 476 (quoting Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989)).
37. Id. at 477.
38. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Veronia
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515' U.S. 646 (1995).
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cocaine by pregnant women among MUSC's patients and associated
health problems "created a special need beyond normal law enforce-
ment goals."39 In balancing government and individual interests, the
court stated M-7 "effectively advanced the public interest" and the
"intrusion suffered by [plaintiffs] was minimal."40 Resolving the issue
in favor of the defendants, the majority concluded "a balancing of
these factors clearly demonstrates that the searches conducted were
reasonable and thus not violative of the Fourth Amendment. 41
Plaintiffs appealed again and the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari on the limited issue of the applicability of the special
needs doctrine to these facts.42 The Supreme Court concluded that the
special needs doctrine did not apply and remanded the case back to
the Fourth Circuit for a ruling on whether the evidence presented at
trial was sufficient to support the jury's finding of consent.4 3 The
majority of the Court differentiated the facts presented in Ferguson
from prior special needs case law, explaining that in earlier cases the
"special need" justifying warrantless searches was separate from the
State's general interest in law enforcement. 44 "In this case ... the cen-
tral and indispensable feature of the policy from its inception was the
use of law enforcement to coerce the patients into substance abuse
treatment. '45 The Court focused on the M-7 policy itself to determine
the purpose "actually served" by MUSC searches and compared this
actual "primary purpose" to a "general interest in crime control."46 In
particular, the Court noted Policy M-7 describes procedures for main-
taining the chain of custody, the range of possible charges, and proto-
col for police notification.47
II. DIscuSSION
A. The Special Needs Doctrine Generally
The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures."48 The purpose of the Fourth Amendment,
39. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 479.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Oral Argument at 31, Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936).
43. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1293.
44. Id. at 1289.
45. Id. at 1290.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 1.
2002] 267
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as expounded by the Supreme Court, is to "safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government offi-
cials."' 49 As a result, two threshold criteria must be satisfied before
Fourth Amendment rights are implicated. First, there must be a state
actor.5 ° Second, the individual privacy expectation in question must
be one that society is willing to recognize as legitimate.51
Generally, a search or seizure is unreasonable when it lacks indi-
vidualized suspicion of wrongdoing.52 However, individualized suspi-
cion is not an "irreducible" attribute of reasonableness.5 3 The
Supreme Court has validated suspicionless searches where they are
designed to meet "special needs beyond the normal need for law
enforcement. '54 Suspicionless "special needs" searches approved by
the Court include: stopping motorists at border control checkpoints to
intercept illegal aliens, 55 sobriety checkpoints to remove drunk drivers
from the road, 6 searches of student belongings for drugs or weapons
on school property, 57 mandatory urine screening for illegal drugs of
customs officers seeking promotion or transfer58 and of railway
employees involved in accidents or safety violations,59 and random
drug testing of student athletes.6" In drug screening cases, the "special
needs" acknowledged are generally health and safety related. In the
case of the National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the
Supreme Court also noted the government's interest in keeping cus-
toms agents, who are on the "frontline" in the war on drugs, from
being susceptible to bribery and blackmail.61
Once a special need is identified, a court must balance that gov-
ernmental interest against the invasion on an individual's privacy and
personal security incurred by the search.62 This balance is resolved as
a matter of law.63 Considerations analyzed in this balancing test con-
49. Camera v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
50. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1287.
51. O'Conner v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987).
52. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
53. Id. at 37.
54. Id.
55. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
56. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
57. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
58. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
59. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executive's Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
60. Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
61. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667.
62. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
63. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1286.
268 [Vol. 24:263
6
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol24/iss2/4
FERGUSON V. CITY OF CHARLESTON
sist of the strength of an individual's privacy expectation in the
affected location or act,64 the invasiveness of the search, 65 the exis-
tence of an adversarial, cooperative, or supervisory relationship
between the searcher and individual,6 6 the use to be made of collected
information,67 the effectiveness of the search in furthering government
interest, 68 evidence that the evil giving rise to the "special need" has
occurred in the past or is presently occurring,69 and the exigency of
the situation or practicality of obtaining probable cause under the
circumstances.7 °
Even in cases where the balancing test is resolved in favor of the
individual, evidence obtained by the search may still be admitted in
judicial proceedings. Whether an exclusionary rule applies involves
two additional questions: whether the evidence was seized in violation
of the Fourth Amendment, and whether its exclusion is the appropri-
ate remedy.71 Both questions must be answered in the affirmative to
exclude the evidence. 72
B. The Effect of Ferguson
1. Multiple or Ultimate Purposes & "Special Need"
Ferguson both shrinks and clarifies the scope of the "special
needs" doctrine by establishing a gateway question in this area of
Fourth Amendment law. After Ferguson, it is clear that a governmental
agency defendant must establish that its "primary purpose" in con-
ducting a suspicionless search was divorced from general law enforce-
ment purposes.73 Multiple and ultimate purposes do not create the
existence of a "special need."'74 Indeed, they may be fatal. "The threat
of law enforcement may ultimately have been intended as a means to
an end, but the direct and primary purpose of MUSC's policy was to
ensure the use of those means. In our opinion, this distinction is
critical."75
64. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987).
65. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626.
66. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 879 (1987).
67. Veronia, 515 U.S. at 658 n.2.
68. Id. at 630.
69. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
70. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38.
71. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333.
72. Id.
73. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1291.
74. Id.
75. Id.
2002]
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The possibility that a search scheme may have dual purposes, one
aimed at civil or social good and one intended to promote the general
interests of law enforcement, is a scenario that the Supreme Court had
explicitly declined to consider until Ferguson. For example, in Skinner,
the Court "[left] for another day" the question of "whether routine use
in criminal prosecutions of evidence obtained pursuant to the adminis-
trative scheme," including mandatory drug screening results from
employees involved in rail yard accidents or certain safety violations,
would remove the searches from the special needs exception. 76 Addi-
tionally, in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court took pains to
point out that it "express[ed] no view on the question whether police
may expand the scope of a license or sobriety checkpoint seizure in
order to detect the presence of drugs in a stopped car. 77 Throughout
its opinion, which held that drug interdiction checkpoints on highways
are impermissible, the Court referenced two prior cases suggesting
searches to remove drunk and/or unlicensed drivers from the roads
may be permissible.78
The awkward procedural posturing in which the Court consid-
ered Ferguson indicates its deliberate intent to clarify "special needs"
at the time it issued certiorari. The Court declined to consider
whether or not the ten plaintiffs had consented to urinalysis. Gener-
ally, the presence or absence of consent is a threshold question in a
Fourth Amendment claim, since one cannot have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy concerning information they have consented to share.79
Instead, the Court assumed consent was absent, despite the district
court jury finding to the contrary. The Court considered whether in
the absence of individualized suspicion, urinalysis screening of the
pregnant patients for cocaine use was permissible under a "special
needs" analysis.80 The questions received by counsel for the respon-
dent, who spent a substantial amount of time discussing consent in
oral argument, made it clear that the Court was not interested in con-
sidering the consent issue.8 To be fair, the Supreme Court noted that
the Fourth Circuit also circumvented the issue of consent, affirming
the district court solely on "special needs grounds."82 The Supreme
76. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621 n.5.
77. 531 U.S. at 47 n.2.
78. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 32; Sitz, 496 U.S. at 444; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979).
79. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
80. Oral Arguments at 30-31, Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936).
81. Id.
82. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1286.
[Vol. 24:263270
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Court's decision in Ferguson corrected confusion in the special needs
doctrine's application not only in the Fourth Circuit, but in all other
circuits as well.
2. State Actors & Primary Purpose
An example of the confusion surrounding application of the spe-
cial needs doctrine prior to Ferguson is the Second Circuit's opinion in
Kia P. v. McIntyre. 3 Kia P. gave birth to her daughter Mora at Long
Island College Hospital (LICH) on March 27, 1993.84 LICH tested
Mora's urine for drugs shortly after birth due to Kia's disclosures that
she had abused cocaine in the past, that she was HIV positive, that she
had a history of tuberculosis and syphilis, and that she had not
received adequate prenatal care.85 The test indicated the presence of
methadone in Mora's urine.8 6 The hospital's mandated reporter noti-
fied the New York State Central Registry for Child Abuse of the results,
and that agency notified the city's Child Welfare Administration
(CWA). 7 Kia was discharged from the hospital on March 29, 1993,
but was not allowed to take Mora home because the hospital wished to
monitor her for methadone poisoning and because Ms. P. was being
investigated by the CWA for child abuse. 8 The hospital held Mora
until April 6, 1993, at which time independent, outside testing of the
sample indicated there was no methadone in Mora's urine and she was
cleared for medical discharge.8 9 Mora was then held two additional
days by the hospital pending notice of the CWA's decision whether or
not to seek custody of the child. She was finally released to Kia on
April 8, the same day the CWA notified the LICH it would not seek
custody.90
Kia P. filed suit claiming, among other things, that Mora was
seized and removed from her parents' custody pursuant to LICH and
city policies in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 91 The district
83. Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749 (2d Cir. 2000).
84. Id. at 751.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. Ms. Morance, the hospital's mandated reporter, told Kia, "I have to talk
to . . . CWA. Your daughter has a social hold on her." You can "come and see [your]
daughter and feed her" but you cannot take her home or stay here yourself. Kia P.,
235 F.3d at 752.
89. Id. at 753. Both Kia and her husband submitted to voluntary drug screening
during this period and tested negative. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
20021
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court applied a "special needs" balancing test to the facts and found as
a matter of law that the seizure was reasonable.92 The circuit court
affirmed in an opinion focusing mainly on the presence or absence of
state action.93
The Second Circuit held: "[tihe traditional definition of acting
under color of a state law requires that the defendant ... have exer-
cised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law."94
LICH was owned and administered by a private corporation and the
Second Circuit found that while LICH was acting to provide necessary
medical care to Mora, it was not a state actor. 95 However, the court
determined that after Mora's medical clearance on April 6, she was
being held by the hospital "solely pending action by the CWA" for its
convenience. 96 LICH was a state actor during this period. 97 The cir-
cuit court then determined that LICH acted reasonably in not dis-
charging Mora because the seizure was brief and the exigencies of the
situation made it difficult for LICH to determine the proper course of
action.98
Here, the question of state action swallows consideration of pur-
pose. The existence of state action is a plaintiffs gateway into Fourth
Amendment claims. 99 Searches and seizures by state actors generally
require probable cause to be reasonable. 10 0 However, some searches
and seizures may be deemed reasonable without probable cause if they
further special needs divorced from the general needs of law enforce-
ment.10 1 Ferguson made clear that the defendant's gateway into the
special needs defense is the existence of a "primary purpose" beyond
law enforcement. 102 If no other purpose can be fairly said to be central
to the policy, then the actors have assumed the role of law enforce-
ment,1 0 3 and individuals require the same safeguards ensuring fair
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 755 (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988)).
95. Id. at 756.
96. Id. at 757.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 763.
99. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1287.
100. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37.
101. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561.
102. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1292.
103. Oral Argument at 29, Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936).
272 [Vol. 24:263
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treatment from law enforcement that the warrant clause ensures for
police conduct.
10 4
The Second Circuit should have considered LICH's purpose in not
discharging Mora when determining what level of safeguard was
required to protect her from this state action. Instead, the c6urt deter-
mined LICH was a state actor, but did not determine the extent to
which the person under which LICH acted permeated its purpose in
acting. These are two separate questions, although it is easy to see that
they may often have the same answer, especially in the case of private
entities that have "become so entwined with governmental policies or
so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to
the constitutional limitations placed upon state action. "105 In Kia P.,
the district court determined that LICH was acting "as part of the
reporting and enforcement machinery for CWA, a governmental
agency charged with detection and prevention of child abuse and neg-
lect."' 106 This determination satisfied the state actor requirement. The
circuit court concluded that LICH refused to release Mora on April 6
"for reasons relating to child abuse and child welfare laws . . . solely
pending action by the CWA."'1 7 This conclusion answers the primary
purpose question, and after Ferguson, precludes defenses based on
auxiliary or ultimate purposes such as meeting the "'special needs' of
child protection agencies."'' 0 8
3. Identifying a Primary Purpose
What makes a purpose primary? The United States Supreme
Court has declined to take a categorical approach to purpose determi-
nations (e.g., all roadside checkpoints for license/registration verifica-
tion are primarily for safety purposes, all drug interdiction
checkpoints implicate general law enforcement purposes).10 9 Instead,
the Court has examined the facts of each case individually. 11
a. Programmatic Evidence
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court first noted "program-
matic purposes may be relevant to the validity of Fourth Amendment
intrusions undertaken pursuant to a general scheme without individu-
104. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622; Veronia, 515 U.S. at 653.
105. Kia P., 235 F.3d at 757.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 762.
109. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44.
110. Id. at 46.
2002]
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alized suspicion."11' In Ferguson, the Court relied exclusively on
"programmatic" evidence when determining the primary purpose of
Policy M-7, examining the document itself: "[tiellingly, the document
codifying the policy incorporate[d] the police's operational guidelines.
It devotes attention to the chain of custody, the range of possible crimi-
nal charges, and the logistics of police notification and arrest.""' 2 Pol-
icy M-7 did not memorialize any special plans for treating affected
mothers or children medically, except for treatment of the mother's
addiction through education, referral to drug treatment programs, and
continued testing." 3
In addition to the policy's content, the Ferguson Court was con-
cerned with the process though which the policy was written. Solicitor
Condon organized the joint task-force that drafted M-7. He set meeting
dates, chose participating organizations, and mailed invitations to
their representatives. 114 The Court notes these were the "first steps" to
creating a procedure for prosecuting pregnant drug abusers." 5
Finally, local police were involved in the administration of M-7.
They organized a meeting with hospital staff explaining how to pre-
serve a chain of custody." 6 Police were given access to medical files
on women receiving substance abuse counseling. 117 The timing of
arrests was coordinated closely with patient discharge.""
All of these "programmatic" factors, the M-7 document itself, its
creation and administration, combined to convince the Court that
MUSC had in effect co-opted the job of local law enforcement. 11 The
fact that MUSC ultimately wished to secure the health and safety of its
patients was not curative. The Court invalidated MUSC's "carrot and
stick" method of obtaining fetal and maternal health because the
immediate goal of urinalysis was to obtain evidence that would create
the stick: threat of immediate prosecution.' 2 ° After Ferguson, it clearly
does not matter what state actor carries out the actual search if the
immediate purpose is to further general law enforcement interests. It
111. Id. at 45.
112. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1290.
113. Id.; Respondents' Brief at 9, Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936).
114. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1284.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1291 n.19.
117. Id. at 1291.
118. Id.
119. Id.; Oral Argument at 29, Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936).
120. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1291.
274 [Vol. 24:263
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is clearly possible for a professional's occupation to become no more
than a pretext for police activity. 1 2 1
b. Subjectivity
Evidence indicating that MUSC had routinely screened pregnant
mothers meeting certain criteria for drug use before adopting Policy M-
7 did not dissuade the Court's belief that MUSC's practices were pri-
marily punitive. 12  Nor did the fact that MUSC staff believed they were
"maximiz[ing] maternal-fetal health and protect[ing] children."' 23 As
one MUSC employee put it: "[t]his was not supposed to be a punitive
policy where we went out and punished people for doing something
even though we knew the activity was illegal. What we were trying to
do is give those babies a chance to be born normal."'124 If anything,
the Court was skeptical of the medical appropriateness of Policy M-7,
pointing out in oral arguments that such practices were accepted by no
other hospitals in South Carolina and four amicus briefs raised serious
questions as to the efficacy of such a policy. 125 Additionally, the
Court indicated it could not find a protective purpose in screening
patients arriving at MUSC for the first time when they were in labor:
"You can't prevent anything after the child is born."'126
Under regular Fourth Amendment rubric, the Court does not
need to consider the subjective intent of the searcher. "'Subjective
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
analysis. ' 1 27 In the special needs arena, purpose is a central question.
However, concrete, "programmatic" evidence has proved most useful to
the Court in determining purpose. The "gravity of the threat alone,"
strong social sympathy, and after the fact statements of intent, cannot
be dispositive of a searcher's motivations. 128
121. Cf. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621 n.5 (Drug screening for railway employees involved
in accidents or safety violations was not a -pretext to enable law enforcement
authorities to gather evidence of penal law violations"' even though the results may be
made available to authorities).
122. Respondents' Brief at 5-7, Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936).
123. Id. at 7.
124. Id.
1"25. Oral Argument at 36-39, Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936).
126. Id. at 32.
127. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45.
128. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1293.
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c. State v. Onumonu
On the night of May 29, 2000, Defendant Onumonu was involved
in a three-car accident at an intersection. 129 Officer Lopez responded
to the scene and arranged for Ms. Onumonu to be transported to
Christiana Hospital. 130 Officer Lopez arrived at the hospital shortly
thereafter to continue his investigation at which time hospital employ-
ees informed him that Ms. Onumonu's blood alcohol content (BAC)
was .22°1%.131 Although no police officer had interviewed Ms.
Onumonu prior to this disclosure, Officer Lopez notified his superior
of the test results and then requested the medical examiner obtain a
blood sample using a departmental blood kit.' 32 The second test indi-
cated a BAC of .138% and these results were used to charge Ms.
Onumonu with "vehicular assault first degree, two counts vehicular
assault second degree, and driving while under the influence of alco-
hol." 1 33 At trial, Ms. Onumonu moved to suppress the results of the
blood alcohol test arguing that "the release to the police of the initial
BAC test, obtained by a physician at a hospital, violated [her] constitu-
tional rights and violated doctor-patient privilege."'134 She argued that
the second BAC test was rendered illegal by the first.135
Superior court Judge Goldstein correctly stated that "Ferguson
held that a state hospital's performance of diagnostic tests to obtain
evidence of a patient's drug use for law enforcement purposes was an
unreasonable search where the patient had not consented and the
search was not authorized by a valid warrant."'136 He then differenti-
ated Ms. Onumonu's case from Ferguson, noting that MUSC was a
state facility while Christiana was not.137 In determining whether
Christiana was behaving as a de facto state actor, Judge Goldstein con-
sidered the hospital's motivation for performing the initial BAC test.
He concluded "[t]here [was] no evidence to suggest that the police, or
other governmental agents, compelled the hospital to analyze Defen-
dant's blood or otherwise acted in a more than passive role in the hos-
pital's performance" of the search. 138 Judge Goldstein was left with the
129. State v. Onumonu, No. 0010002000, 2001 WL 695539, *at 1 (Del. Super. Ct.
June 18, 2001).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. *at 2.
137. Id.
138. Id. *at 3.
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question that the Ferguson court explicitly declined to answer. The
Ferguson court stated: "We do not address a case in which doctors
independently complied with reporting requirements."'139 Although
the superior court ultimately disposed of the issue, determining there
was no state action invoking Fourth Amendment protections, its rea-
soning was based on the Ferguson Court's analysis of primary pur-
pose. 140  While state action and primary purpose are similar
questions, they are separate considerations that should come at differ-
ent stages of Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
d. Jurisprudential Considerations
The Ferguson majority acted to close what they perceived to be a
hole in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence through which non-law
enforcement parties concerned with social welfare could perform sus-
picionless searches producing evidence for punitive purposes. The
Court stated: "Because law enforcement involvement always serves
some broader social purpose or objective, under respondent's view, vir-
tually any suspicionless search can be immunized under the special
needs doctrine." '141 All that would be required to swallow Fourth
Amendment protections is an agent who also seeks one of law enforce-
ment's broader purposes or objectives.' 42 In Ferguson, MUSC acted as
just such an agent, collecting evidence from patients for use in crimi-
nal prosecution, but seeking ultimately to ensure the health of mother
and child.
Purpose inquiries of this nature are challenging. In the Fourth
Amendment context, the inquiry gives the odd result of proscribing
programs motivated by illicit purposes, while comparable programs
carrying out similar searches or seizures will be allowed if motivated
by proper purposes. 4 3 This is the effect of State v. Onumonu. Hospital
staff discovered information about Ms. Onumonu's BAC in the normal
course of providing her medical care that they then decided to share
with Officer Lopez. Their information supplied officer Lopez with
probable cause to conduct his own search. 14 4
139. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1292 n.24.
140. Onumonu, 2001 WL 695539, *at 2-4.
141. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1291-92.
142. Oral Argument at 53-54, Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001) (No. 99-936).
143. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47.
144. Onumonu, 2001 WL 695539, *at 1.
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III. CONCLUSION
Ferguson closes a gap in Fourth Amendment "special needs" juris-
prudence by clarifying and shrinking the exception. Whether or not a
search and seizure policy has a "primary purpose" divorced from the
general needs of law enforcement is now a gateway question into per-
missible "special needs" suspicionless searches. This consideration is
similar to, but separate from the question of whether there is a state
actor, which first invokes Fourth Amendment protections. Primary
purposes are best determined by documents memorializing a search or
seizure policy, the parties and the method creating the policy, and the
way the policy is administered. Subjective intent of individuals, the
gravity of perceived harm, and ultimate social good are of little proba-
tive value in making this determination. Ferguson's holding in no way
prevents physicians from sharing independently obtained information
with police under existing mandatory reporting requirements.
Lucinda Clements
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